S.L. 370.15 Art. 29Transitory provision.

(1) Parent financial holding companies and parent mixed financial holding companies already existing on 27 June 2019 shall apply for approval in accordance with Article 10CA of the

Investment Services Act by 28 June 2021. If a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company fails to apply for approval by 28 June 2021, appropriate measures shall be taken pursuant to Article 10CA(6) of the Investment Services Act.

(2) During the transitional period referred to in the previous sub-regulation, the competent authority shall have all the necessary supervisory powers conferred on it by the CRD as transposed in Maltese Law with regard to financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies subject to approval in accordance with Article 10CA of the Investment Services Act for the purposes of consolidated supervision. Substituted by: SCHEDULE I L.N. 30 of 2022. SUPERVISORY REVIEW AND EVALUATION

(Regulation 11)

(1) In addition to credit, market and operational risks, the evaluation performed by the competent authority pursuant to regulation at least:

(a) the results of the stress test carried out in accordance with the CRR by investment firms applying an internal approach to calculate their credit risk-weighted exposure;

(b) the exposure to and management of concentration risk firms including their compliance with the Investment transposing the requirements of the CRD and the requirements Part Four of the CRR;

(c) the robustness, suitability and manner of application of the procedures implemented by investment firms for the management residual risk associated with the use of recognised credit techniques;

(d) the extent to which the own funds held by an investment of assets which it has securitised are adequate having economic substance of the transaction, including the transfer achieved;

(e) the exposure to, measurement and management of liquidity investment firms including the development of alternative analyses, the management of risk mitigants (in particular composition and quality of liquidity buffers) and effective plans;

(f) the impact of diversification effects and how such effects into the risk measurement system;

(g) the results of stress tests carried out by investment firms internal model to calculate market risk own funds requirements Part Three, Title IV of Chapter 5 of the CRR;

(h) the geographical location of investment firm’s exposures;

(i) the business model of the investment firm;

(2) For the purposes of point (e) of paragraph 1 of this Schedule, authority shall regularly carry out a comprehensive assessment of the overall risk management by investment firms and promote the development of methodologies. In its review, the competent authority shall have regard to by investment firms in the financial markets. The competent authority consider the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial all other Member States concerned.

(3) The competent authority shall monitor whether an investment provided implicit support to a securitisation. If an investment firm is provided implicit support on more than one occasion the competent authority measures reflective of the increased expectation that it will provide future securitisation thus failing to achieve a significant transfer of risk.

For the purposes of the determination to be made under regulation 11(3), authority shall consider whether the valuation adjustments taken for portfolios in the trading book, as set out in Article 105 of the CRR, enable firm to sell or hedge out its positions within a short period without material losses under normal market conditions.

(1) The review and evaluation performed by the competent authority shall exposure of investment firms to the interest rate risk arising from non-trading

The supervisory powers shall be exercised at least in the following cases:

where an investment firm’s economic value of equity as referred to in Article 84(1) of the CRD as transposed in Maltese Law declines by more than 15% of its Tier 1 capital as a result of a sudden and unexpected change in interest rates as set out in any of the six supervisory shock scenarios applied to interest rates; where an investment firm’s net interest income referred to in Article 84(1) of the CRD as transposed in Maltese Law experiences a large decline as a result of a sudden and unexpected change in interest rates as out in any of the two supervisory shock scenarios applied to interest rates.

Notwithstanding sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph (5), the competent not be obliged to exercise supervisory powers where it considers, based and evaluation referred to in this paragraph, that the investment firm’s of interest rate risk arising from non-trading book activities is adequate and investment firm is not excessively exposed to interest rate risk arising from non-activities.

For the purpose of this paragraph, the term "supervisory powers" means the to in paragraph 1 of Schedule III or the power to specify modelling and assumptions, other than those identified by the EBA pursuant to point (b) of of Article 98 of the CRD as transposed in Maltese Law, to be reflected by firms in their calculation of the economic value of equity under Article 84(1) transposed in Maltese Law.

The review and evaluation performed by the competent authority shall exposure of investment firms to the risk of excessive leverage as reflected by excessive leverage, including the leverage ratio determined in accordance 429 of the CRR. In determining the adequacy of the leverage ratio of firms and of the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms by investment firms to manage the risk of excessive leverage, the authority shall take into account the business model of those investment review and evaluation conducted by the competent authority shall governance arrangements of investment firms, their corporate culture and ability of members of the management body to perform their duties. In conducting that review and evaluation, the competent authority have access to agendas and supporting documents for meetings of the body and its committees, and the results of the internal or external performance of the management body.

SCHEDULE II Amended by: L.N. 30 of 2022. SUPERVISORY EXAMINATION PROGRAMME (Regulation 13)

(1) The annual supervisory examination programme referred to in shall contain the following:

(a) an indication of how the competent authority intends to tasks and allocate its resources;

(b) an identification of which investment firms are intended enhanced supervision and the measures taken for such supervision out in paragraph 3;

(c) a plan for inspections at the premises used by an investment including its branches and subsidiaries established in States in accordance with regulation 7 of these regulations regulations 3, 10, and 19 of the Supervisory Consolidation

(2) Supervisory examination programmes shall include investment firms:

(a) investment firms for which the results of the stress tests points (a) and (g) of paragraph (1) of Schedule I and regulation the outcome of the supervisory review and evaluation regulation 11, indicate significant risks to their on going soundness or indicate breaches of the Act, and any regulations issued thereunder transposing the requirements of the CRD CRR;

(b) any other investment firm which the competent authority necessary.

(3) Where appropriate under regulation 11 the following measures particular, be taken if necessary:

(a) an increase in the number or frequency of on-site inspections investment firm;

(b) a permanent presence of the competent authority at the investment

(c) additional or more frequent reporting by the investment firm;

(d) additional or more frequent review of the operational, business plans of the investment firm;

(e) thematic examinations monitoring specific risks that materialise.

(4) Adoption of a supervisory examination programme by a home regulatory authority with respect to a European Investment Firm which has a branch in Malta, shall not prevent the competent authority in its host Member State from carrying out, on a case-by-case basis, on-checks and inspections of the activities carried out by branches of firms in Malta in accordance with the Act and these regulations.

SCHEDULE III Amended by: SUPERVISORY POWERS L.N. 299 of 2015; Substituted by: (Regulations 11, 16, paragraphs (4) and (5) of L.N. 30 of 2022. Schedule I and regulation 15(4)) Amended by:

For the purposes of regulations 11, 16 and paragraphs (4) and (5) of regulation 15(4), and the application of the CRR, the competent authority least the following powers:

require investment firms to have additional own funds in excess of the requirements set out in the CRR under the conditions set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 of this Schedule; require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies implemented in accordance with Articles 73 and 74 of the CRD as transposed in Maltese Law; require investment firms to present a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to the Act, regulations or Investment Services Rules issued thereunder, and to the CRR and set a deadline for implementation, including improvements to that plan regarding the scope and the deadline; require investment firms to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements; restrict or limit the business, operations or network of institutions or request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks to the soundness of an investment firm; require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems of investment firms, including outsourced activities; require investment firms to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of net revenues where it is inconsistent with the maintenance a sound capital base; require investment firms to use net profits to strengthen own funds; restrict or prohibit distributions or interest payments by an investment firm to shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier instruments within the meaning of the CRR, where the prohibition does not constitute an event of default of the investment firm; impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements, including reporting on own funds, liquidity and leverage; impose specific liquidity requirements, including restrictions on maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities; require additional disclosures.

(2) (1) For the purpose of paragraph 1(j) of this Schedule, authority may only impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements investment firms where the relevant requirement is appropriate and proportionate regard to the purpose for which the information is required and where requested is not duplicative.

(2) For the purposes of regulations 11 to 16, any additional information may be required from investment firms shall be deemed as duplicative where or substantially the same, information has already been otherwise competent authority or may be produced by the competent authority.

(3) The competent authority shall not require an investment additional information where it has previously received it in a different format granularity and that different format or granularity does not prevent authority from producing information of the same quality and reliability as on the basis of the additional information that would be otherwise reported.

(3) (1) The competent authority shall impose the additional requirement referred to in paragraph 1(a) of this Schedule where, on reviews carried out in accordance with regulations 11 and 15, it determines following situations for an individual investment firm:

(a) the investment firm is exposed to risks or elements of risk covered or sufficiently covered, as specified in paragraph Schedule, by the own funds requirements set out in Parts and Seven of the CRR and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2402;

(b) the investment firm does not meet the requirements set 73 and 74 of the CRD as transposed in the Investment Services in Article 393 of the CRR and it is unlikely that other measures would be sufficient to ensure that those requirements met within an appropriate time frame;

(c) the adjustments referred to in paragraph (4) of Schedule be insufficient to enable the investment firm to sell or positions within a short period without incurring material normal market conditions;

(d) the evaluation carried out in accordance with regulation that the non-compliance with the requirements for the application permitted approach shall likely lead to inadequate requirements;

(e) the investment firm repeatedly fails to establish or maintain level of additional own funds to cover the guidance communicated accordance with paragraph 10 of this Schedule;

(f) other institution-specific situations deemed by the competent to raise material supervisory concerns.

(2) The competent authority shall only impose the additional requirement referred to in paragraph 1(a) of this Schedule to cover the risks individual investment firms due to their activities, including those reflecting of certain economic and market developments on the risk profile of investment firm.

(1) For the purpose of paragraph 3(1)(a) of this Schedule, risks or risk shall only be considered as not covered or sufficiently covered by the requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of the CRR and in Regulation (EU) No. 2017/2402 where the amounts, types and distribution considered adequate by the competent authority, taking into account the review of the assessment carried out by investment firms in accordance with paragraph of Article 73 of the CRD as transposed in Maltese Law are higher funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of the CRR and Regulation (EU) No. 2017/2402.

For the purpose of the first sub-paragraph, the competent authority shall into account the risk profile of each individual investment firm, the risks to investment firm is exposed, including:

institution-specific risks or elements of such risks that are explicitly excluded from or not explicitly addressed by the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of the CRR and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) No. 2017/2402; institution-specific risks or elements of such risks likely to be underestimated despite compliance with the applicable requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of the CRR and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) No. 2017/2402.

To the extent that risks or elements of risk are subject to transitional or grandfathering provisions laid down in the CRD and transposed in or in the CRR, they shall not be considered risks or elements of such risks underestimated despite compliance with the applicable requirements set out Four and Seven of the CRR and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) No.

For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), the capital considered adequate shall or elements of risks identified as material pursuant to the assessment laid sub-paragraph (2) that are not covered or not sufficiently covered by the own requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of the CRR and in Chapter 2

(EU) No. 2017/2402.

Interest rate risk arising from non-trading book positions may be material at least in the cases referred to in paragraph 5 of Schedule I, unless authority, in performing the review and evaluation, come to the the investment firm’s management of interest rate risk arising from non-activities is adequate and that the investment firm is not excessively interest rate risk arising from non-trading book activities.

(1) Where additional own funds are required to address risks other than excessive leverage not sufficiently covered by point (d) of Article 92(1) of the competent authority shall determine the level of additional own funds required paragraph 3(a) of this Schedule as the difference between the capital considered pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Schedule and the relevant own funds set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 2 of Regulation (EU) No. 2017/2402.

(2) Where additional own funds are required to address the risk leverage not sufficiently covered by point (d) of Article 92(1) of the CRR, authority shall determine the level of the additional own funds required under 3(a) of this Schedule as the difference between the capital considered adequate to paragraph 4 of this Schedule and the relevant own funds requirements Three, Four and Seven of the CRR.

(6) (1) The investment firm shall meet the additional requirement imposed by the competent authority under paragraph 1(a) of to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage with own funds following conditions:

(a) at least three quarters of the additional own funds requirement met with Tier 1 capital;

(b) at least three quarters of the Tier 1 capital referred to in be composed of Common Equity Tier 1 capital.

(2) By way of derogation from the first sub-paragraph (1), authority may require the investment firm to meet its additional own funds with a higher portion of Tier 1 capital or Common Equity Tier 1 necessary, and having regard to the specific circumstances of the investment

(3) Own funds that are used to meet the additional own funds referred to in paragraph 1(a) of this Schedule imposed by the competent address the risk of excessive leverage not sufficiently covered by point 92(1) of the CRR shall not be used to meet any of the following:

(a) the own funds requirement set out in point (d) of Article CRR;

(b) the combined buffer requirement;

(c) the guidance on additional own funds referred to in paragraph Schedule where that guidance addresses the risks other than excessive leverage.

(4) Own funds that are used to meet the additional own funds referred to in paragraph 1(a) of this Schedule imposed by the competent address the risk of excessive leverage not sufficiently covered by point 92(1) of the CRR shall not be used to meet any of the following:

(a) the own funds requirement set out in point (d) of Article CRR;

(b) the leverage ratio buffer requirement referred to in Article CRR;

(c) the guidance on additional own funds referred to in paragraph Schedule, where that guidance addresses risks of excessive

(7) The competent authority shall duly justify in writing to each firm the decision to impose an additional own funds requirement under paragraph this Schedule. That justification shall include, in the case set out in paragraph Schedule, a specific statement of the reasons for which the imposition additional own funds is no longer considered sufficient. Pursuant to the strategies and processes referred to in Article 73 of the transposed in Maltese Law, investment firms shall set their internal capital at an of own funds that is sufficient to cover all the risks that an investment exposed to and to ensure that the investment firm’s own funds can absorb resulting from stress scenarios, including those identified under the stress test referred to in regulation 14.

(1) The competent authority shall regularly review the level of the set by each investment firm in accordance with paragraph 8 of this part of the reviews and evaluations performed in accordance with regulation

(2) Pursuant to that review, the competent authority shall determine for firm the overall level of own funds it considers appropriate.

(1) The competent authority shall communicate its guidance on funds to investment firms.

The guidance on additional own funds shall be the own funds exceeding amount of own funds required pursuant to Parts Three, Four and Seven of Chapter 12 of Regulation (EU) No. 2017/2402, paragraph 1(a) of this Schedule 128(6) of the CRD as transposed in Maltese Law or pursuant to Article CRR as relevant, which are required to reach the overall level of own funds appropriate by the competent authority pursuant to paragraph 9 of this

The competent authority’s guidance on additional own funds pursuant to of this Schedule shall be institution-specific. The guidance may cover risks the additional own funds requirement imposed pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) only to the extent that it covers aspects of those risks that are not already that requirement.

(1) Own funds that are used to meet the guidance on additional own communicated in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Schedule to address risks risk of excessive leverage shall not be used to meet any of the following:

the own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of the CRR; the requirement laid down in paragraphs 3 to 7 of this Schedule imposed the competent authority to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage and the combined buffer requirement.

(2) Own funds that are used to meet the guidance on additional own communicated in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Schedule to address the excessive leverage shall not be used to meet the own funds requirement set out in Article 92(1) of the CRR, the requirement laid down in paragraphs 3 to 7 of imposed by the competent authority to address the risk of excessive the leverage ratio buffer requirement referred to in Article 92(1a) of the

Failure to meet the guidance referred to in paragraph 10 of this Schedule where an investment firm meets the relevant own funds requirements Three, Four and Seven of the CRR and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) the relevant additional own funds requirement referred to in paragraph Schedule and, as relevant, the combined buffer requirement or the leverage requirement referred to in Article 92(1a) of the CRR shall not trigger referred to in Article 141 or 141b of the CRD as transposed in the Investment Rules.

(14) The competent authority shall notify the Resolution Committee additional own funds requirement imposed on investment firms paragraph 1(a) of this Schedule and of any guidance on additional communicated to investment firms in accordance with paragraph Schedule.

SCHEDULE IV DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (Regulation 22)

(1) The competent authority shall publish the following information regulation 22 herein:

(a) the general criteria and methodologies adopted to review with Articles 405 to 409 of the CRR;

(b) without prejudice to the confidentiality provisions summary description of the outcome of the supervisory description of the measures imposed in cases of non-compliance Articles 405 to 409 of the CRR identified on an annual basis.

(2) If the competent authority exercises the discretion laid down of the CRR it shall publish the following information:

(a) the criteria it applies to determine that there is no current material practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer funds or repayment of liabilities;

(b) the number of parent investment firms or credit institutions benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in the CRR and the number of those which incorporate subsidiaries third country;

(c) on an aggregate basis for Malta:

(i) the total amount of own funds on the consolidated parent investment firm or credit institution in benefits from the exercise of the discretion laid down 7(3) of the CRR, which are held in subsidiaries in a

(ii) the percentage of total own funds on the consolidated parent investment firms in Malta which benefit from of the discretion laid down in Article 7(3) represented by own funds which are held in subsidiaries country;

(iii) the percentage of total own funds required under Article CRR on the consolidated basis of parent investment credit institutions in Malta, which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 7(3) of the CRR, represented by own funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country. competent authority exercises the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) shall publish all the following: the criteria it applies to determine that there is no current or foreseen material practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities; the number of parent investment firms or credit institutions which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of the CRR and the number of such parent investment firms which incorporate subsidiaries in a third country; an aggregate basis for Malta:

(i) the total amount of own funds of parent investment firms which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of the CRR which are held in subsidiaries in a third country;

(ii) the percentage of total own funds of parent investment firms or credit institutions which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of the CRR represented by own funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country;

(iii) the percentage of total own funds required under Article 92 of the CRR of parent investment firms or credit institutions which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of the CRR represented by own funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country.

SCHEDULE V BODIES WITH WHOM THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY MAY EXCHANGE INFORMATION (Regulation 6)

competent authority may exchange information with: European regulatory authorities and may transmit information to the or ESMA in accordance with the CRD, the CRR and with article 15 of

(EU) No. 1092/2010, with Articles 31, 35 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No. with Articles 31 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010;

Authorities entrusted with the public duty of supervising other financial and the authorities responsible for the supervision of financial

Authorities or bodies charged with responsibility for maintaining the the financial system in Member States through the use of macro rules; Reorganisation bodies or authorities aiming at protecting the stability of the system; Contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in Article 113(7) of the CRR;

(6) Bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of institutions other similar procedures;

(7) Persons responsible for carrying out statutory audits of the institutions, insurance undertakings and financial institutions;

(8) Bodies which administer deposit-guarantee schemes compensation schemes of information necessary for the exercise of their

(9) Authorities responsible for overseeing:

(a) the bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of in other similar procedures;

(b) contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred 113(7) of the CRR;

(c) persons charged with carrying out statutory audits of the institutions, insurance undertakings and financial institutions; In the cases referred to sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) above, the information shall be subject to the following conditions:

(i) that the information is exchanged for the purpose the tasks referred to;

(ii) where the information originates in another Member is not disclosed without the express agreement of which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement;

(10) (a) Authorities or bodies responsible under law for the investigation of breaches of company law subject to conditions:

(i) that the information is exchanged for the purpose of investigating breaches of company law;

(ii) where the information originates in another Member is not disclosed without the express agreement of which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement.

(b) Where the authorities or bodies referred to in paragraph perform their task of detection or investigation with the their specific competence, of persons appointed for that purpose employed in the public sector, information may be exchanged persons under the conditions specified in points (i) and paragraph (a) of this paragraph. The competent authority communicate to the EBA the names of the authorities or may receive information pursuant to this Article;

(11) ESCB central banks and other bodies with a similar function capacity as monetary authorities when the information is relevant for their respective statutory tasks, including the conduct of monetary policy liquidity provisions, oversight of payments, clearing and settlement systems safeguarding of stability of the financial system;

(12) Contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred 113(7) of the CRR;

(13) Other public authorities responsible for overseeing payment

ESRB, EIOPA and ESMA, where that information is relevant for the their tasks under Regulations (EU) No 1092/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 or 1095/2010; emergency situation as referred to in regulation 5 of the Supervisory Regulations, the competent authority shall communicate, without information to the ESCB central banks where that information is relevant for of their statutory tasks, including the conduct of monetary policy and liquidity provision, the oversight of payments, clearing and settlement the safeguarding of the stability of the financial system, and to the such information is relevant for the exercise of its statutory tasks;

Other departments of Member States central government administrations responsible for law on the supervision of institutions, financial and insurance undertakings and to inspectors acting on behalf of those provided that such disclosures may be made only where necessary for reasons of prudential supervision, and prevention and resolution of failing institutions. persons having access to such information shall be subject to professional secrecy. emergency situation as referred to in Article 114(1) of the CRD, to information which is relevant to the departments referred to in the first sub-this article in all Member States concerned;

Parliamentary enquiry committees, courts of auditors and other entities enquiries relating to the prudential supervision of institutions in Malta, following conditions:

that the entities have a precise mandate under national law to investigate scrutinise the actions of authorities responsible for the supervision of institutions or for laws on such supervision; that the information is strictly necessary for fulfilling the mandate referred to in sub-paragraph (a); the persons with access to the information are subject to professional secrecy requirements under national law; where the information originates in another Member State that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the authorities which have disclosed it and, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement.

Information received pursuant to paragraphs (1) to (8) inclusive of this information obtained by means of an on-the-spot check or inspection regulation 7 of these regulations, shall not be disclosed to the bodies paragraphs 16 and 17(1) of this Schedule save with the express consent authorities which disclosed the information or of the authorities of the in which such an on-the-spot check or inspection was carried out.

Recognised clearing houses or other similar bodies responsible for the clearing or settlement services in order to ensure the proper functioning in relation to defaults or potential defaults by market participants of information referred to in paragraph (1) of this Schedule and articles 17(7) and 17F of the Act.

(2) The information received under paragraph (1) of this Schedule disclosed in the circumstances referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of without the express consent of the competent authorities, which have

(19) Authorities responsible for supervising the obliged entities

(1) and (2) of Article 2(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist the European Parliament and of the Council for compliance with the said

(20) (1) Notwithstanding Articles 26(1) and 17(7) of the Investment Act, the competent authority may, subject to the conditions set out in 2, 3 and 4 of this paragraph, transmit or share certain information with

(a) the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, for of assessments for the Financial Sector Assessment Program;

(b) the Bank for International Settlements, for the purposes impact studies;

(c) the Financial Stability Board, for the purposes of its function.

(2) The competent authority may only share confidential following an explicit request by the relevant body, where at least conditions are met:

(a) the request is duly justified in light of the specific tasks the requesting body in accordance with its statutory mandate;

(b) the request is sufficiently precise as to the nature, scope the required information, and the means of its transmission;

(c) the requested information is strictly necessary for the performance the specific tasks of the requesting body and does not statutory tasks conferred on the requesting body;

(d) the information is transmitted or disclosed exclusively directly involved in the performance of the specific task;

(e) the persons having access to the information are subject secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred 26(1) of the Investment Services Act.

(3) Where the request is made by any of the entities referred to in 1, the competent authority may only transmit aggregate or anonymised and may only share other information at the premises of the competent

(4) To the extent that the disclosure of information involves processing data, any processing of personal data by the requesting body shall comply requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament the Council.